# Safe Seats, <br> <br> Dangerous Democracy 

 <br> <br> Dangerous Democracy}

How Politicians Draw Districts to Rig Election Results
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## Executive Summary

Ohio's current districts provide weak competition:
■ Four of eighteen Ohio congressional districts are competitive.
■ Five of thirty-three Ohio Senate districts are competitive.
■ Fifteen of ninety-nine Ohio House districts are competitive.

Uncontested races: Two of Ohio's members of Congress, four state senators, and twenty-two members of the Ohio House ran unopposed. All but three of these twenty-eight uncontested candidates represented safe districts.

Weak Candidates: By design, safe districts often produce weak candidates who sometimes do worse than their party's presidential candidate in the same district. All ten of the worst performing winning House candidates came from safe districts. Only two of the ten strongest House candidates came from safe districts. Only four of the ten strongest performing Senate candidates came from safe districts, while none of the bottom ten performing senators came from a competitive district. The only winning congressional candidate who did worse than his party's presidential nominee (Oxley) is from a safe district.

Gerrymandering was $\mathbf{9 3 \%}$ successful in rigging election results: The candidate who was favored by the partisan composition of the district won the election in 117 out of 126 districts that are either safe or leaning safe seats. In the twenty-four districts that were drawn to be competitive, the candidate favored by the partisan makeup of the district won only $45 \%$ of the time.

Moderates of all parties are severely underrepresented at the congressional level:

■ The $38 \%$ of Ohio voters who identify as moderates are represented by only $7 \%$ of the congressional delegation.

■ $21 \%$ of Ohioans identified themselves as liberals, while $33 \%$ of Ohio's congressional delegation are liberal.

- 40\% of Ohioans identified themselves as conservatives. $55 \%$ of Ohio's congressional delegation are conservative.


## Women are underrepresented:

More than half ( $51.4 \%$ ) of Ohio voters are women. Only $22 \%$ of the Ohio House, $15 \%$ of the Ohio Senate, and $16 \%$ of the Ohio congressional delegation were women after the 2004 elections.

Republicans, who controlled the 2001 redistricting, are currently overrepresented and Democrats are underrepresented:

- 49\% of Ohio voters cast ballots in favor of Democratic candidates for Congress in 2004 while $33 \%$ of Ohio's congressional delegation is Democrat. $51 \%$ of Ohio voters cast ballots in favor of Republican candidates for Congress in 2004 while $66 \%$ of Ohio's congressional delegation is Republican.

43\% of Ohio voters supported Democratic candidates in the 2002 and 2004 Senate elections while $33 \%$ of the senators selected by theses votes are Democrats. $57 \%$ of Ohio voters supported Republican candidates in the 2002 and 2004 Senate elections while $67 \%$ of the senators selected by these votes are Republicans.
$48 \%$ of Ohio voters cast ballots for a Democratic candidate for the Ohio House in 2004. Just $38 \%$ of the candidates elected were Democrats (one has since switched parties). $51 \%$ of Ohio voters cast ballots for a Republican candidate for the Ohio House in 2004. 62\% of the candidates elected were Republicans.

All of the top ten safest seats in the Ohio house are held by Democrats, an indication that Democratic voters were packed into districts to reduce their representation.

The party that controls redistricting historically has gained considerably, picking up an average of eight seats in the House and two in the Senate:

- The Democrats gained thirteen seats in the Ohio House and eight seats in the Ohio Senate after controlling the 1971 redistricting despite George McGovern losing Ohio by more than twenty points in the 1972 presidential election.

■ The Democrats gained six seats in the Ohio House but gained no seats in the Ohio Senate after controlling the 1981 redistricting despite Jimmy Carter losing Ohio by more than ten points in the 1982 presidential election.

■ The Republicans gained eight seats in the Ohio House and lost one seat in the Ohio Senate after controlling the 1991 redistricting process while losing the presidential race by two points.

- The Republicans gained three seats in the Ohio House in 2002 and one seat in the Ohio Senate after controlling the 2001 redistricting process.


## Introduction

Democracy is the bedrock of modern government. The state has authority to enact and enforce laws on citizens only because it is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

In a representative democracy, citizens choose to not involve themselves in the daily decisions of government. Rather, they elect representatives to govern on their behalf. The legitimacy of the laws passed by those representatives depends upon the legitimacy and integrity of the elections process that selects government officials.

Democracy is hard work. History has shown that all too often, men and women in positions of power would rather manipulate the elections process to maintain their power unfairly rather than continually winning over the hearts and minds of their fellow citizens. Attempts to rig election results have ranged from stuffing ballot boxes to intimidating certain citizens from voting to bribing voters for their support.

Each violation in the spirit of democracy brings with it a new reform aimed at tightening the rules to ensure that elections results truly represent the will of the voters. The secret ballot reduced voter bribery and intimidation; non-partisan election boards helped oversee the balloting and vote counting process to prevent ballot stuffing and other election fraud.

The United States Constitution establishes that the House of Representatives shall re ect the populations of each state. To accomplish this, a census is taken every ten years and House seats are apportioned to each state based on the size of their population. This reapportionment process has historically
meant that states that either gained or lost congressional seats had to redraw political districts to re ect the new size of their congressional delegation.

One abuse of power that is receiving renewed attention is the intentional drawing of political districts to advantage incumbents or partisan interests. The way political boundaries are drawn fundamentally determines how competitive elections will be, how accurately they will represent people's political beliefs, and how well they will preserve local

## "The way political boundaries are drawn fundamentally determines how

 competitive elections will be, how accurately they will represent people's political beliefs, and how well they will preserve local geography of cities, townships, and counties." geography of cities, townships, and counties. Unscrupulous politicians who would rather cheat their way into office than win a difficult election have practiced this illicit process, known as gerrymandering, for more than a century. The word "gerrymander" actually comes from 1812 when a Massachusetts Governor named Eldridge Gerry drew a district that looked like a salamander in order to place his opponents into one district.The most egregious historical abuse of political districts was when some districts contained considerably more voters than others. Racist officeholders used this technique to under-represent African-American citizens, creating districts that contained large numbers of black voters that received only one representative while smaller numbers of whites elected multiple representatives from a greater number of smaller population districts. The Supreme Court decision Baker v. Carr put an end to this process and established the "one person, one vote" principle that requires all political districts to be roughly the same population. To comply with Baker, states redraw their legislative and state senate districts every ten years in addition to updating their congressional districts.

Powerful computer mapping software offers politicians and their cronies the ability to gerrymander districts with much greater precision than was previously possible. By using data from party registration and previous election results, district mappers can go block by block to select or omit neighborhoods and achieve districts that have an artificial tilt to achieve the results that the mappers want.

It has become commonplace for the political party that controls the redistricting process in Ohio to draw political boundaries that advantage candidates of their own party. Often, the majority party will "pack" voters of the opposing party into districts that are overwhelmingly of that party. This ensures that the minority party will win the packed district, but dilutes their strength in surrounding districts. Alternatively, a majority party will "crack" a geographic community into two or more districts.
Cracking takes a county or town that
would otherwise be able to elect a candidate of the minority party and combines it with voters in strongholds of the majority party to deprive the minority party of winning any seats in that area. Other tricks involve moving a district boundary to include the address of an individual officeholder, or to ensure that two incumbents of the same party don't wind up in the same district and have to run against each other.

Gerrymanders can disrupt three important features of fair and accurate representation:

Competition. For democracy to work, incumbent politicians and ruling parties must be aggressively challenged by opposing candidates and parties in order to hold elected officials accountable and ensure that they continue to represent the will of the voters. This does not mean that it is inherently anti-democratic for one candidate to defeat another by a large margin. For example, the landslide elections of 1984 when Ronald Reagan soundly defeated Walter Mondale and 1964 when Johnson trounced Goldwater were not any less democratic than the more narrow presidential election of 1960 when Kennedy beat Nixon. Sometimes the electorate widely favors one candidate or party. A fair elections process will re ect that mood - not artificially create a tighter race.

But, the evidence from Ohio is that political line-drawing is artificially dampening competition by intentionally drawing districts that overrepresent one party or another. This creates a considerably more lopsided playing field than would exist naturally. When voters in one district are hand-picked to overwhelmingly come from one party, it is difficult for the opposing party to
recruit strong candidates because they can readily tell that they have little chance of winning. Media coverage and voter interest decline because the results of the election have been predetermined by the map drawers so there is little reason for voters to show up on election day or follow futile campaigns in the news media.

## Accurate political representation.

 Another basic tenet of democratic elections is that the elected government should accurately re ect the people's values and political beliefs. So a voting population that was $55 \%$ anti-abortion would be represented by a legislature that was $55 \%$ anti-abortion. A population that was $11 \%$ gay would have a legislature that is roughly $11 \%$ homosexual.The evidence from Ohio suggests that the current political boundaries artificially underrepresent moderate voters, women, and Democrats.

## Preserving local communities.

While geography is not the sole defining characteristic of representative politics, it remains an important one. The citizens of any given county, city, or township will have some local concerns that they share in common with each other more than with neighboring communities. Urban areas may be primarily concerned about crime and education while more rural communities would prioritize land use or family values, for example.

The evidence from Ohio suggests that geographic communities are being needlessly divided by the current political districts.

## Balancing values in single-member

 districts. The Ohio Constitution requires that each political district elect one single representative.Single-member districts were an important reform that improved upon at-large representation where all of a district's voters elected multiple members by casting one simple yes or no ballot and the winners being selected by a plurality.

However, single-member districts present inherent trade-offs between the values of competition, accurate political representation, and preservation of geographic communities. For instance, people who live near each other often share similar politics. Urban centers tend to favor Democrats while rural areas tend to favor Republicans. Thus, any single member district that is drawn to preserve those geographic communities may be very uncompetitive.

The best long-term solution would be to adopt multi-member districts that are larger in size than singlemember districts. These larger districts would be inherently harder to gerrymander and would tend to keep geographic communities intact. Rather than at-large voting systems, the electoral process could use other voting methods such as cumulative voting, or ranked voting, that provide results that accurately represented a political constituency's strength in the electorate - a process known as proportional representation.

Voters may need to know considerably more about proportional representation until they are ready to adopt these systems. In the meantime, we should strive for single member districts that are drawn with the goal of carefully balancing the values of competition, accurate political representation, and geographic communities instead of with the goal of artificially creating partisan advantage or protecting certain incumbents.

## Competition -- Ohio Congressional Delegation

To measure the inherent general election competitiveness of a political district, we examined the vote for president in each of Ohio's congressional districts. We believe that the presidential vote in a hotly contested election year is the best indication of the partisan preferences of the voters in that district. Despite a very close competition nationally and within Ohio between John Kerry and George Bush, most of Ohio's congressional districts were drawn to include a strong majority of either Bush or Kerry voters.

In only four of eighteen congressional districts did a presidential candidate win by fewer than five percentage points. These districts, shown in grey on the map, are predisposed to be competitive between the two parties at the congressional level. The actual elections held in these districts may or may not be close, depending on other factors such as incumbency and campaign fundraising.

Nine of Ohio's congressional districts were drawn to advantage Republicans. Six of these districts, shown in red, were carried by President Bush by ten or more percentage points, and three of them, shown in pink, were carried by Bush by five to ten percentage points.

Five of Ohio's congressional districts were drawn to advantage Democrats. All five of these districts were carried by John Kerry by ten or more percentage points. There were no districts created that leaned Democrat, where Kerry won by 5-10 \% of the vote.

A list of the least competitive congressional districts appears to the right. Six are safe Republican seats and four are safe Democrat seats.

2002-2012
Ohio Congressional Districts Map
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## 10 Safest Congressional Seats

| District | Rating | Congressional <br> Winner | Pres. <br> Margin | Kerry | Bush |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 11 | Safe Democrat | Tubbs Jones-D | $63 \%$ | $81 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
| 4 | Safe Republican | Oxley-R | $31 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $65 \%$ |
| 8 | Safe Republican | Boehner-R | $29 \%$ | $35 \%$ | $64 \%$ |
| 2 | Safe Republican | Portman-R | $28 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $64 \%$ |
| 17 | Safe Democrat | Ryan-D | $26 \%$ | $63 \%$ | $37 \%$ |
| 5 | Safe Republican | Gillmor-R | $22 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $61 \%$ |
| 9 | Safe Democrat | Kaptur-D | $17 \%$ | $58 \%$ | $42 \%$ |
| 10 | Safe Democrat | Kucinich-D | $17 \%$ | $58 \%$ | $41 \%$ |
| 7 | Safe Republican | Hobson-R | $15 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $57 \%$ |
| 18 | Safe Republican | Ney-R | $15 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $57 \%$ |

We then analyzed how each winning congressional candidate did in relation to how their district was predisposed. In every congressional race but one, Representative Oxley's, the winning congressional candidate had a stronger comparative showing than their party's presidential candidate. This would suggest that either the winning congressional candidates in Ohio were strong candidates who ran more competitive campaigns than President Bush or John Kerry, or that the losing candidate was a comparatively weaker campaigner. Given that both President Bush and John Kerry ran extremely vibrant campaigns in Ohio, we suspect the latter explanation -many congressional challengers are comparatively weak candidates. The design of congressional districts may be one reason why both parties have trouble recruiting strong candidates. Why would somebody drop their private life and subject themselves to the
rigors of a campaign to run in a district that has been drawn to virtually assure the election of your opponent?

Gerrymandering was remarkably successful in determining general election results. In all of the fourteen districts that we rated as either safe or leaning toward one party, that party's congressional candidate won.

In seventeen out of eighteen congressional races, the congressional candidate who was advantaged by the way district boundaries were gerrymandered won the election. The one exception was Ted Strickland, a Democrat who was unopposed even while running in a district that slightly favored President Bush.

In addition to Mr. Strickland, Stephanie Tubbs Jones ran unopposed, meaning that $11 \%$ of Ohio's congressional races saw not even token competition.

## Congressional Candidate Performance Compared to Presidential Performance

| District | Rating | Congr Winner | Congressional <br> Margin | Compared to <br> Presidential <br> Margin | Pres. <br> Margin | Kerry | Bush |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 6 | Competitive | Strickland-D | $100 \%$ | 0.99 | $1 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $50 \%$ |
| 11 | Safe Democrat | Tubbs Jones- <br> D | $100 \%$ | 0.37 | $63 \%$ | $81 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
| 17 | Safe Democrat | Ryan-D | $54 \%$ | 0.29 | $26 \%$ | $63 \%$ | $37 \%$ |
| 16 | Lean Republican | Regula-R | $33 \%$ | 0.25 | $8 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $54 \%$ |
| 13 | Safe Democrat | Brown-D | $35 \%$ | 0.24 | $11 \%$ | $55 \%$ | $44 \%$ |
| 12 | Competitive | Tiberi-R | $24 \%$ | 0.21 | $3 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $51 \%$ |
| 14 | Lean Republican | LaTourette-R | $25 \%$ | 0.20 | $5 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $53 \%$ |
| 9 | Safe Democrat | Kaptur-D | $36 \%$ | 0.20 | $17 \%$ | $58 \%$ | $42 \%$ |
| 15 | Competitive | Pryce-R | $20 \%$ | 0.19 | $1 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $50 \%$ |
| 1 | Competitive | Chabot-R | $20 \%$ | 0.19 | $1 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $50 \%$ |
| 18 | Safe Republican | Ney-R | $32 \%$ | 0.18 | $15 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $57 \%$ |
| 2 | Safe Republican | Portman-R | $43 \%$ | 0.16 | $28 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $64 \%$ |
| 3 | Lean Republican | Turner-R | $25 \%$ | 0.15 | $9 \%$ | $45 \%$ | $54 \%$ |
| 7 | Safe Republican | Hobson-R | $30 \%$ | 0.15 | $15 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $57 \%$ |
| 5 | Safe Republican | Gillmor-R | $34 \%$ | 0.12 | $22 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $61 \%$ |
| 10 | Safe Democrat | Kucinich-D | $26 \%$ | 0.10 | $17 \%$ | $58 \%$ | $41 \%$ |
| 8 | Safe Republican | Boehner-R | $38 \%$ | 0.09 | $29 \%$ | $35 \%$ | $64 \%$ |
| 4 | Safe Republican | Oxley-R | $17 \%$ | $10.14)$ | $31 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $65 \%$ |

## Competition -- Ohio Senate

Only five out of thirty-three senate districts are rated competitive -- meaning that they were won by either presidential candidate by a margin less than five points. These districts are shown in grey on the accompanying map. Three of these five districts were won by the party whose presidential candidate carried the district.

Thirteen senate districts are safe seats for Republicans, shown in red, where President Bush won by ten points or more. Another three, shown in pink, lean Republican because President Bush carried them by five to ten points. Republican senate candidates won in all sixteen of these districts -- in other words, the gerrymandering was $100 \%$ successful in these districts.

Ten districts are safe senate seats for the Democrats, shown in dark blue, and another two lean Democratic, shown in light blue. Democrats won all ten of their safe seats, but in an anomaly Republicans won both of the two seats that lean Democrat.

Of the ten safest seats in the Senate, five are Democrat and five are Republican. Note, however, that four of the top five safest seats are Democratic seats -- an indication that Democrats may have been intentionally packed into very safe districts so as to dilute their strength outside of those districts. This could also have the effect of advantaging extremely liberal candidates and disadvantage moderates in the Democratic primaries that are held in those safe Democratic seats.

Ohio Senate Districts Map Margin of Victory - 2004 Presidential Elections

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## 10 Safest State Senate Seats

| Senate <br> District | Rating | Winning <br> Senator | Pres. <br> Margin | Kerry | Bush |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 21 | Safe Democrat | Prentiss - D | $67 \%$ | $83 \%$ | $16 \%$ |
| 25 | Safe Democrat | Fingerhut - D | $61 \%$ | $80 \%$ | $19 \%$ |
| 15 | Safe Democrat | Miller - D | $48 \%$ | $73 \%$ | $26 \%$ |
| 12 | Safe Republican | Jordan - R | $37 \%$ | $31 \%$ | $68 \%$ |
| 9 | Safe Democrat | Mallory - D | $36 \%$ | $68 \%$ | $32 \%$ |
| 1 | Safe Republican | Wachtmann - R | $35 \%$ | $32 \%$ | $67 \%$ |
| 11 | Safe Democrat | Fedor - D | $34 \%$ | $67 \%$ | $33 \%$ |
| 7 | Safe Republican | Schuler - R | $34 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $67 \%$ |
| 4 | Safe Republican | Cates- R | $32 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $66 \%$ |
| 14 | Safe Republican | Niehaus- R | $28 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $64 \%$ |

Four of thirty-three Senate districts, or $12 \%$, were uncontested in either 2002 or 2004. All were safe seats.

Only six of the winning senate candidates performed worse in their elections than their party's own presidential candidate. Of the ten worst performing winning Senate candidates, none were from competitive districts and eight were from safe seats. This is a possible indication that safe districts lead to weaker winning candidates who don't need to work hard to win an election.

In comparison, only four of the top ten best performing Senate winners came from safe seats while five came from

Senate Winners who were Unopposed

| District | Rating |  |
| :---: | :--- | :--- |
| 22 | Safe Republican | Amstutz - R |
| 31 | Safe Republican | Hottinger - R |
| 26 | Safe Republican | Mumper - R |
| 9 | Safe Democrat | Mallory - D |

competitive districts. Three of the top four best performing Senate victors represent competitive districts.

## Top 10 Senate Winners with Opponents Compared to Presidential Performance

| Senate <br> District | Rating | Winning <br> Senator | Sen Margin | Compared <br> to Pres | Pres <br> Margin | Kerry | Bush |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 30 | Competitive | Wilson - D | $34 \%$ | 0.31 | $3 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $51 \%$ |
| 12 | Safe Republican | Jordan - R | $59 \%$ | 0.22 | $37 \%$ | $31 \%$ | $68 \%$ |
| 24 | Competitive | Spada - R | $24 \%$ | 0.21 | $3 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $51 \%$ |
| 2 | Competitive | Gardner - R | $25 \%$ | 0.21 | $5 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $52 \%$ |
| 16 | Lean Republican | Stivers- R | $24 \%$ | 0.17 | $7 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $53 \%$ |
| 33 | Safe Democrat | Hagan - D | $36 \%$ | 0.17 | $19 \%$ | $59 \%$ | $40 \%$ |
| 10 | Safe Republican | Austria - R | $29 \%$ | 0.14 | $15 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $57 \%$ |
| 29 | Competitive | Schuring - R | $16 \%$ | 0.14 | $2 \%$ | $51 \%$ | $49 \%$ |
| 32 | Safe Democrat | Dann - D | $32 \%$ | 0.14 | $19 \%$ | $59 \%$ | $40 \%$ |
| 3 | Competitive | Goodman - R | $16 \%$ | 0.13 | $2 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $51 \%$ |

Bottom 10 Sen. Winners with Opponents Compared to Presidential Performance

| Senate <br> District | Rating | Winning <br> Senator | Sen Margin | Compared <br> to Pres | Pres <br> Margin | Kerry | Bush |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 14 | Safe Republican | Niehaus- R | $34 \%$ | 0.06 | $28 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $64 \%$ |
| 20 | Lean Republican | Padgett- R | $7 \%$ | 0.01 | $6 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $53 \%$ |
| 1 | Safe Republican | Wachtmann - R | $36 \%$ | 0.01 | $35 \%$ | $32 \%$ | $67 \%$ |
| 8 | Safe Republican | Clancy- R | $27 \%$ | 0.01 | $27 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $63 \%$ |
| 4 | Safe Republican | Cates- R | $31 \%$ | $(0.01)$ | $32 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $66 \%$ |
| 15 | Safe Democrat | Miller - D | $46 \%$ | $(0.02)$ | $48 \%$ | $73 \%$ | $26 \%$ |
| 21 | Safe Democrat | Prentiss - D | $65 \%$ | $(0.03)$ | $67 \%$ | $83 \%$ | $16 \%$ |
| 13 | Lean Democrat | Armbruster - R | $0 \%$ | $(0.07)$ | $7 \%$ | $53 \%$ | $46 \%$ |
| 5 | Safe Democrat | Roberts - D | $5 \%$ | $(0.09)$ | $14 \%$ | $57 \%$ | $43 \%$ |
| 17 | Safe Republican | Carey Jr-R | $8 \%$ | $(0.14)$ | $21 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $60 \%$ |

## Competition -- Ohio House

Fifteen of the ninety-nine Ohio House districts are competitive, meaning that there is a roughly equal split between Democratic and Republican voters as evidenced in their support for presidential candidates. We rated any district with a margin of victory less than five points in the presidential race as competitive. These districts are shown in grey on the accompanying map. Only $33 \%$ of these competitive seats were won by the Ohio house candidate whose own party's presidential nominee also carried the district.

Forty-five districts, shown in red, are rated safe Republican districts and another seven, shown in pink, are rated as leaning Republican. Of these fiftytwo districts, Republicans won $90 \%$ of the races.

Twenty-seven House districts, shown in dark blue, are safe Democratic seats and another five lean Democrat. Of these thirty-two seats, Democrats won $88 \%$ of the races.

Taken in combination, this means that of 84 non-competitive seats, the party who was favored by the district lines won 77 races. Thus, gerrymandering was 92 percent effective for Ohio House races.

All of the top ten safest House seats are rated as safe Democratic seats. This provides additional evidence that Democratic voters have been packed into a smaller number of highly Democratic districts in order to dilute their strength in surrounding districts.

There were twenty-two members of the Ohio House who face no competition at all in the last election. All but two of these came from safe seats and only one was from a competitive seat. Another three winners face no major party opposition.

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## 10 Safest State House Seats

| House <br> District | Rating | Winning <br> Representative | Pres. <br> Margin | Kerry | Bush |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 12 | Safe Democrat | Debose - D | $71 \%$ | $85 \%$ | $14 \%$ |
| 9 | Safe Democrat | Woodard - D | $68 \%$ | $84 \%$ | $16 \%$ |
| 10 | Safe Democrat | Smith - D | $66 \%$ | $83 \%$ | $17 \%$ |
| 11 | Safe Democrat | Key - D | $65 \%$ | $83 \%$ | $17 \%$ |
| 27 | Safe Democrat | Beatty - D | $65 \%$ | $82 \%$ | $17 \%$ |
| 8 | Safe Democrat | Mason - D | $63 \%$ | $81 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
| 48 | Safe Democrat | Brown - D | $58 \%$ | $79 \%$ | $21 \%$ |
| 44 | Safe Democrat | Sykes - D | $58 \%$ | $79 \%$ | $21 \%$ |
| 26 | Safe Democrat | Mitchell - D | $58 \%$ | $79 \%$ | $21 \%$ |
| 60 | Safe Democrat | Patton - D | $57 \%$ | $78 \%$ | $21 \%$ |

House winners who were unopposed
District Rating Winner
District
Rating
Winner

| 4 | Safe Republican | Williamowski - R | 44 | Safe Democrat | Sykes - D |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 5 | Safe Republican | Shaffer - R | 48 | Safe Democrat | Brown - D |
| 8 | Safe Democrat | Mason - D | 51 | Lean Republican | Oelslager - R |
| 9 | Safe Democrat | Woodard - D | 54 | Safe Republican | Combs - R |
| 10 | Safe Democrat | Smith - D | 66 | Safe Republican | Uecker - R |
| 11 | Safe Democrat | Key - D | 67 | Safe Republican | Raga - R |
| 13 | Safe Democrat | Skindell - D | 73 | Safe Republican | Harnett - D |
| 23 | Safe Republican | Wolpert - R | 74 | Safe Republican | Buehrer - R |
| 26 | Safe Democrat | Mitchell - D | 78 | Safe Republican | Seaver - D |
| 27 | Safe Democrat | Beatty - D | 80 | Competitive | Redfern - D |
| 32 | Safe Democrat | Barrett - D | 94 | Safe Republican | Aslanides - R |

Of the ten best performing candidates compared to their own party's presidential nominees, only two came from safe districts. However, all ten of the weakest performing House winners came from safe districts.

These results bolster the theory that uncompetitive districts lead to weak candidates of both parties. In a heavily gerrymandered district, the minority party has trouble finding a strong candidate to run because it is nearly hopeless for that candidate to prevail when the odds are stacked against him
or her. But counter-intuitively, the majority party can also get by with weak candidates precisely because the deck is stacked in their favor. When the opposing minority candidate is weak, the majority party need not field a strong candidate to prevail.

Top 10 House Winners with Opponents Compared to Presidential Performance

| House <br> District | rank | Winner | House \% | Compared <br> to Pres | Pres. Margin | Kerry | Bush |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 31 | Lean Democrat | Driehaus - D | $39 \%$ | 0.29 | $9 \%$ | $54 \%$ | $45 \%$ |
| 99 | Lean Democrat | Distel - D | $35 \%$ | 0.29 | $5 \%$ | $52 \%$ | $47 \%$ |
| 95 | Lean Democrat | Domenick - D | $38 \%$ | 0.28 | $10 \%$ | $55 \%$ | $45 \%$ |
| 61 | Competitive | Boccieri - D | $31 \%$ | 0.28 | $3 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $51 \%$ |
| 18 | Lean Republican | Patton - R | $33 \%$ | 0.28 | $5 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $52 \%$ |
| 89 | Lean Republican | Book - D | $33 \%$ | 0.27 | $7 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $53 \%$ |
| 49 | Safe Democrat | Perry - D | $42 \%$ | 0.23 | $19 \%$ | $59 \%$ | $40 \%$ |
| 22 | Competitive | Hughes - R | $22 \%$ | 0.21 | $1 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $50 \%$ |
| 45 | Safe Democrat | Otterman - D | $48 \%$ | 0.19 | $29 \%$ | $64 \%$ | $35 \%$ |
| 68 | Lean Democrat | Chandler - D | $28 \%$ | 0.18 | $9 \%$ | $54 \%$ | $45 \%$ |

Bottom 10 House Winners with Opponents Compared to Pres. Performance

| House <br> District | Rating | Winner | House \% | Compared <br> to Pres | Pres. Margin | Kerry | Bush |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 58 | Safe Republican | Walcher - R | $8 \%$ | $(0.04)$ | $12 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $56 \%$ |
| 86 | Safe Republican | Daniels - R | $22 \%$ | $(0.06)$ | $28 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $64 \%$ |
| 71 | Safe Republican | Evans - R | $15 \%$ | $(0.06)$ | $22 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $61 \%$ |
| 93 | Safe Republican | Garrison - D | $3 \%$ | $(0.07)$ | $10 \%$ | $45 \%$ | $55 \%$ |
| 30 | Safe Republican | Seitz - R | $46 \%$ | $(0.07)$ | $53 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $76 \%$ |
| 29 | Safe Republican | Blessing Jr - R | $12 \%$ | $(0.08)$ | $21 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $60 \%$ |
| 88 | Safe Republican | Bubp - R | $25 \%$ | $(0.08)$ | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $66 \%$ |
| 25 | Safe Democrat | Stewart - D | $10 \%$ | $(0.09)$ | $18 \%$ | $59 \%$ | $40 \%$ |
| 91 | Safe Republican | Hood - R | $5 \%$ | $(0.11)$ | $17 \%$ | $41 \%$ | $58 \%$ |
| 64 | Safe Democrat | Law - R | $8 \%$ | $(0.14)$ | $22 \%$ | $61 \%$ | $39 \%$ |

## Geographic Communities

Although most people imagine that political districts are drawn to group together people who live near each other and share common interests as residents of the same city, township, or county, district mappers routinely divide organic communities into two or more political districts.

- Twenty of Ohio's counties are divided into two or more congressional districts.
- Thirteen of Ohio's counties are divided into two or more state senate districts.

■ Twenty-five of Ohio's counties are divided into two or more state house districts.

While some local division is necessary when a county has more voters than can be apportioned into a single district, the details of Ohio's divisions suggests that geographic communities are broken up suggests that the slicing and dicing is done for political reasons.

Political parties who want to exploit the redistricting process to maximize their power have a variety of techniques at their disposal to do so. In the 2001 redistricting, Ohio Republicans used three techniques to maximize their political power: packing, cracking, and cherry-picking.

With packing, the party in power packs as many voters of the opposing party into as small a number of districts as possible. While this creates safe districts for the opposition party, it dilutes that party's strength throughout the surrounding area, allowing the party in power to pick up additional seats it otherwise might not. Packing is often used in metropolitan areas with enough population for multiple districts, typically stuffing urban voters into separate districts
from suburban voters.

Cracking is the redistricting version of divide and conquer. With cracking, the party in power splits the voters of the opposing party into two or more districts, diluting their voting power by spreading them throughout multiple districts.

Each of Ohio's thirty-three Senate districts contains exactly three of Ohio's ninety-nine House districts. By cherry-picking voters into three contiguous House districts that can then comprise a Senate district, the party with the power of the redistricting pen can minimize the representation in the Senate of the voters of the party out of power.

The effects of these gerrymandering techniques in Ohio are particularly pronounced in certain areas of the state, often urban areas with sufficient populations to slice and dice to suit the partisan designs of the party in charge of drawing the districts. Following is a look at how gerrymandering works in five Ohio counties.

## Cuyahoga County

Cuyahoga's urban center, Cleveland, is comprised largely of Democratic voters, while the suburbs are more evenly split. The 2001 plan packed Democrats into nine safe urban House districts while creating two safe Republican suburban House districts (16 and 18) and two House districts which lean Republican (17 and 98). Republicans cherry-picked voters in House Districts 16, 17, and 18 to create a safe Republican Senate district, District 24, which wraps around the city of Cleveland much the way the district of Elbridge Gerry, gerrymandering's namesake, wrapped around $19^{\text {th }}$ century suburban Boston.

## Franklin County <br> While Franklin County voters

overwhelmingly voted for the Democratic presidential candidate in 2004, the Congressional, Senate, and House districts drawn in 2001 resulted in a Republican advantage of 3-0, 2-1, and 6-3 respectively in the Franklin county delegation those political bodies. At the House level, Democrats were packed into two safe Democrat districts and one leaning Democrat district. Those three districts were then packed into one safe Democrat Senate district, giving Franklin County Republicans two Senate seats. At the congressional level, the strongly Democratic county was cracked into three separate districts, none of which elected a Democrat, all of which stretched into at least two other counties.

## Hamilton County

The total number of Democrat votes in Hamilton County's 2004 Ohio House races outnumbered the total number of Republican votes, yet Republicans won five of the county's eight House seats. Democrats were packed into three House districts, one of which was extended along the Ohio River in a band about as wide as a boardwalk. As with Franklin County, those three Democrat House seats were packed into one safe Democrat Senate seat.

## Montgomery County

As with Hamilton County, the total number of Democrat votes in Montgomery County's 2004 Ohio House races outnumbered the total number of Republican votes, yet the district-drawing Republicans won three of the county's five seats. Democrats were packed into two safe Democrat House districts, which were in turn packed into a safe Democrat Senate seat.

Interestingly, the 1991 plan included almost all of Montgomery County in the $3^{\text {rd }}$ Congressional District, which voted Democrat in all five elections

## Cuyahoga County Congressional Districts



## Cuyahoga County House Districts



## Cuyahoga County

| Year | President |  | Congress |  |  | House |  |  | Senate* |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Cand. | Votes | Party | Votes | Seats | Party | Votes | Seats | Party | Votes | Seats |
| 2004 | Kerry (D) | 448,503 | Dem. | 429,561 | 3 | Dem. | 375,890 | 9 | Dem. | 250,759 | 3 |
| 2004 | Bush (R) | 221,600 | Rep. | 133,381 |  | Rep. | 154,275 | 4 | Rep. | 167,202 | 2 |

*Because Senate races are staggered, the Senate data reflects the 2002 and 2004 elections.
Safe Seats, Dangerous Democracy
GOP Margin >10\%
GOP Margin 5-10\%
Winning Margin <5\%
Dem Margin 5-10\%
Dem Margin >10\%

Franklin County Congressional Districts


Franklin County House Districts


Franklin County

| Year | President |  |  | Congress |  |  |  | Vouse | Senate* |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Cand. | Votes | Party | Votes | Seats | Party | Votes | Seats | Party | Votes |  |
| 2004 | Kerry (D) | 285,801 | Dem. | 208,174 | 0 | Dem. | 210,398 | 3 | Dem. | 147,355 |  |
| 2004 | Bush (R) | 237,253 | Rep. | 262,523 | 3 | Rep. | 217,905 | 6 | Rep. | 170,737 |  |

*Because Senate races áre staggered, the Senate data reflects the 2002 and 2004 elections.


Montgomery County

| Year | President |  | Congress |  |  | House |  |  | Senate* |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Cand. | Votes | Party | Votes | Seats | Party | Votes | Seats | Party | Votes | Seats |
| 2000 | Gore (D) | 114,597 | Dem. | 178,132 | 1 | Dem. | 102,494 | 2 |  |  |  |
| 2000 | Bush (R) | 109,792 | Rep. | $899 * *$ | 1 | Rep. | 90,201 | 4 |  |  |  |
| 2004 | Kerry (D) | 142,997 | Dem. | 117,069 | 0 | Dem. | 127,989 | 2 | Dem. | 95,408 | 1 |
| 2004 | Bush (R) | 138,371 | Rep. | 155,914 | 2 | Rep. | 126,769 | 3 | Rep. | 127,407 | 1 |

*Because Senate races are staggered, the Senate data reflects the 2002 and 2004 elections.
**Natural Law candidate received 36,516 votes in $3^{\text {rd }}$ District Congressional Race.
held under the 1991 plan. Republicans cracked the county's Democrat voters in the 2001 plan, resulting in two congressional districts, neither one of which fit entirely within Montgomery County, as the $3^{\text {rd }}$ District had. While Montgomery County voted for the Democratic presidential candidate over the Republican candidate in 2000 and 2004, the 2001 districts resulted in a Republican advantage of 2-0 in congressional representation.

## Summit County

Summit County leans Democratic, as evidenced by Democratic candidates receiving more votes than Republican candidates at the Presidential, Congressional, Senate, and House level in 2004. The 2001 Republicandrawn plan packed Democrats into two safe Democratic state House districts, while creating two safe Republican districts and one district which leans Republican. In 2002, this plan resulted in three Republican House seats and two Democratic House seats.

The plan backfired when the Republican representing the $41^{\text {st }}$ House District, Bryan Williams, chose not to run for re-election in 2004. Despite the fact that the voters of the $41^{\text {st }}$ district chose Bush over Kerry, those voters chose the Democratic candidate for the Ohio House - Brian Williams.

2000 Montgomery County Congressional Distriats



Hamilton County

| Year | President |  | Party Congress |  |  | House |  |  | Senate* |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Cand. | Votes |  |  |  | Party | Votes | Seats | Party | Votes | Seats |
| $\frac{2004}{2004}$ | Kerry (D) | $\frac{19}{29,679}$ | Dem. | 151,716 | 0 | Dem. | 194,459 | 3 | Dem. | 132,830 | 2 |
|  | Bush (R) | 22,616 | Rep | 253,643 |  | Rep | 181,758 |  | Rep. | 148,411 | 2 |

*Because Senate races are staggered, the Senate data reflects the 2002 and 2004 elections.



Summit County

| Year | President |  |  | Congress |  |  |  | House |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Cand. | Votes | Party | Votes | Seats | Party | Votes | Seats | Party | Votes |
| 2004 | Kerry (D) | 156,587 | Dem. | 154,852 | 2 | Dem. | 154,310 | 3 | Demats |  |
| 2004 | Bush (R) | 118,558 | Rep. | 98,525 | 1 | Rep. | 111,875 | 2 | 110,851 | 1 |

[^0]
## Accurate Political Representation

Another basic tenet of democratic elections is that the elected government should accurately re ect the people. So hypothetically a voting population where $55 \%$ of the population opposed abortion would be represented by a legislature that was $55 \%$ pro-life; a population that was $11 \%$ gay would have a legislature that is roughly $11 \%$ homosexual; and so on.

While we did not do exhaustive analysis of Ohio's demographics and current representation, the evidence from Ohio suggests that the current political boundaries most underrepresent moderate voters and women. Democrats are also underrepresented, but not to the same extent as moderates are.

## Moderates are severely under-

 represented in Congress:The $38 \%$ of Ohio voters who identify as moderates are represented by less than $7 \%$ of the congressional delegation. Many political observers believe that electing more moderates would lead to a legislature that was more likely to compromise and less prone to partisan gridlock. Party leaders would have less of a stranglehold on power as moderates of both major parties broke ranks occasionally. While the point of election reform is not to increase the ranks of moderates for the sake of moderation (there is nothing anti-democratic about voters, or their elected representatives, disagreeing with each other), it is likely that providing fair and accurate representation of moderate voters would have beneficial results.

## Both liberals and conservatives are overrepresented in Congress:

$21 \%$ of Ohioans identified themselves as liberals while $33 \%$ of Ohio's congressional delegation are liberal.
themselves as conservatives while $60 \%$ of Ohio's congressional delegation are conservative.

We arrived at these groupings of liberal, moderate, and conservative Congressmen by examining voting scorecards from the American Conservative Union, American for Tax Reform, Americans for Democratic Action, and the AFLCIO. Representatives in the bottom and top quartiles were rated as liberal and conservative, while those who scored between 25 and 75 were rated moderate.

Am Conservative Union:
Liberal 6
Moderate 2
Conservative 10

Americans for Tax Reform:
Liberal 6
Moderate 0
Conservative 12

Americans for Democratic Action:
Liberal 6
Moderate 0
Conservative 12

## AFL-CIO:

Liberal 6
Moderate 3
Conservative 9

Taken together, this produces an average ideological rating of the Ohio congressional delegation as follows:

Liberal 6 (33.3\%)
Moderate 1.25 (6.9\%)
Conservative 10.75 (59.7\%)

## Women are underrepresented in

 Ohio:51.4 percent of Ohio voters are women. Only $22 \%$ of the Ohio House, $15 \%$ of the Ohio Senate, and $16 \%$ of the Ohio congressional delegation were women after the 2004 elections.

Democrats are underrepresented, Republicans are overrepresented :

- $49 \%$ of Ohio voters cast ballots in favor of Democratic candidates for Congress while $33 \%$ of Ohio's congressional delegation is Democrat. $51 \%$ of Ohio voters cast ballots in favor of Republican candidates for Congress while $66 \%$ of Ohio's congressional delegation is Republican.
$43 \%$ of Ohio voters supported a Democratic candidate in the 2002 and 2004 Senate elections while $33 \%$ of the senators elected are Democrats. $57 \%$ of Ohio voters supported a Republican candidate in the 2002 and 2004 Senate elections while $67 \%$ of the senators elected are Republicans.
- $48 \%$ of Ohio voters cast ballots in favor of Democratic candidates for the Ohio House. Just $38 \%$ of candidates selected by these ballots were Democrats (one has since switched parties). $51 \%$ of Ohio voters cast ballots in favor of Republican candidates for the Ohio House while $62 \%$ of candidates selected by these ballots were Republicans.

All of the top ten safest seats in the Ohio House are held by Democrats, an indication that Democratic voters were packed into a districts to reduce their representation.

## African Americans are inaccurately represented at the federal level:

$11.5 \%$ of Ohio voters are African Americans. $14 \%$ of the Ohio House, $12 \%$ of the Ohio Senate, and $5 \%$ of Ohio's congressional delegation are African American. However, the packing of African American voters at both state and federal level likely dilutes their political leverage with non-African American legislators.

## History of Ohio's Redistricting

New legislative and congressional districts are drawn in Ohio after each ten-year census to re ect changes in population. The Ohio Legislature is responsible for drawing the state's congressional districts, while the Ohio Apportionment Board draws the state's legislative districts. The Apportionment Board consists of five members: the governor, state auditor, secretary of state, one person chosen by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the leader in the Senate of the political party of which the speaker is a member, and one person chosen by the legislative leaders of the major political party of which the speaker is not a member. (Article XI, Ohio Constitution)

## History

Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr (1962), seats in Ohio's state legislature were apportioned by county, pursuant to Article XI of the Ohio Constitution of 1851. To achieve compliance with Baker's "one person, one vote" doctrine, the state General Assembly proposed a constitutional amendment to the voters in May 1965 which would have apportioned Ohio's House of Representatives by population. The voters rejected the amendment 681,283 to 595,288. In May 1967, the General Assembly proposed a constitutional amendment to the voters which would have apportioned both the Ohio House of Representatives and the Ohio Senate. Voters rejected the amendment 850,068 to 699,021 . In November 1967, the General Assembly presented a revised version of the May proposal, which voters approved 1,315,736 to 908,010.

The amendment finally passed by Ohio voters created the Ohio Apportionment Board to draw 33 Senate districts and 99 House of Representatives districts for the state. Because legislative leaders from each of the two major parties select one member of the Apportionment Board,
> "For the past four cycles, the party that controlled the redistricting process reaped considerable gains in the legislature in the following election cycles."

partisan control of the Board and thus the composition and placement of Ohio's legislative districts boils down to the elections for three state offices: governor, state auditor, and secretary of state. The executive branch's role in drawing legislative districts in Ohio erodes the constitutional checks and balances because the executive branch has enormous leverage over both individual legislators and the entire legislature by virtue of its ability to craft legislative districts.

The Ohio Legislature is assisted in drawing the state's congressional districts by a Legislative Taskforce on Redistricting, Reapportionment, and Demographic Research. Both the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate each get to appoint three members to the taskforce, including no more than two members of the same political party and one member who must not be a member of the General Assembly. Under current public records laws, the public cannot request documents produced by the taskforce.

For the past four cycles, the party that controlled the redistricting process reaped considerable gains in the legislature in the ensuing election cycles.

## 1970's

In 1970, the following officials won their elections, placing them on the Apportionment Board in charge of drawing Ohio's legislative districts in 1971: Thomas Ferguson, State Auditor (D); Ted Brown, Secretary of State (R); John Gilligan, Governor (D). Under the last elections using county-centered districts, Republicans had a 54-45 advantage over Democrats in the Ohio House of Representatives and a 20-13 advantage in the Senate. Under the first elections held using the new population-centered districts drawn in 1971, Democrats gained thirteen seats in the House for a 58-41 advantage. Because Senate races are staggered, the full impact of the 1971 redistricting on representation in the Senate wasn't apparent until after the 1974 elections, where Democrats won a total of nine seats more than they had in 1970, for a 21-12 advantage in the Senate.

## 1980's

In 1978, Ohio voters elected Thomas Ferguson (D) as State Auditor, Tony

| Year | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Redistricting } \\ & \text { Party } \end{aligned}$ | House |  |  |  | Senate |  |  |  | President (OH Vote) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | D |  |  |  |
|  |  | D | R | Adv. | +/- |  |  |  |  | D | R | Adv. | +/- | Cand. | \% | Cand. | \% |
| 1970 |  | 45 | 54 | R +9 |  | 13 | 20 | R + 7 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1972 | Democrat | 58 | 41 | D +17 | D +13 |  |  |  |  | McGovern | 38 | Nixon | 59 |
| 1974 |  |  |  |  |  | 21 | 12 | D +9 | D +8 |  |  |  |  |


| Year | Redistricting Party | House |  |  |  | Senate |  |  |  | President (OH Vote) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | D |  | R |  |
|  |  | D | R | Adv. | +/- |  |  |  |  | D | R | Adv. | +/- | Cand. | \% | Cand. | \% |
| 1980 |  | 56 | 43 | D +13 |  | 15 | 18 | R +3 |  | Carter | 41 | Reagan | 52 |
| 1982 | Democrat | 62 | 37 | D +26 | D +6 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1984 |  |  |  |  |  | 15 | 18 | R +3 | None |  |  |  |  |


| Year | Redistricting Party | House |  |  |  | Senate |  |  |  | President (OH Vote) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | D |  | R |  |
|  |  | D | R | Adv. | +/- |  |  |  |  | D | R | Adv. | +/- | Cand. | \% | Cand. | \% |
| 1990 |  | 61 | 38 | $D+23$ |  | 12 | 21 | R +9 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1992 | Republican | 53 | 46 | D +7 | R +8 |  |  |  |  | Clinton | 40 | Bush | 38 |
| 1994 |  |  |  |  |  | 13 | 20 | R +7 | D +1 |  |  |  |  |


| Year | Redistricting Party | House |  |  |  | Senate |  |  |  | President (OH Vote) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | D |  |  |  |
|  |  | D | R | Adv. | +/- |  |  |  |  | D | R | Adv. | +/- | Cand. | \% | Cand. | \% |
| 2000 |  | 40 | 59 | R +19 |  | 12 | 21 | R +9 |  | Gore | 47 | Bush | 50 |
| 2002 | Republican | 37 | 62 | R +25 | R +3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2004 |  |  |  |  |  | 11 | 22 | R +11 | R +1 |  |  |  |  |

Celebrezze, Jr. (D) as Secretary of State, and James Rhodes (R) as Governor, putting Democrats in control of the Apportionment Board in 1981 and in charge of drawing Ohio's legislative districts for the 1980's. In 1980, the last election under the previous redistricting plan, Democrats won a 56-43 advantage over Republicans in the Ohio House, while Republicans won a 18-15 advantage over Democrats in the Senate. In the first elections held under the 1981 redistricting plan, Democrats gained six seats in the House for a 62-37 advantage over Republicans. After the 1984 elections, neither party gained seats, leaving Republicans with the same 18-15 advantage in the Senate that they enjoyed in 1980.

In 1981, Ohio voters rejected a Republican-sponsored constitutional amendment that would have created a redistricting commission to draw the state's 132 legislative districts.

## 1990's

In 1990, Ohio voters elected Thomas Ferguson (D) as State Auditor, Robert Taft III (R) as Secretary of State, and George Voinovich (R) as Governor, putting Republicans in control of the Apportionment Board and in charge of drawing Ohio's legislative districts for the 1990's. In 1990, the last election
held under the 1981 redistricting plan, Democrats won a 61-38 advantage over Republicans in the Ohio House, while Republicans won a 21-12 advantage over Democrats in the Senate. In 1992, the first elections held under the 1991 redistricting plan, Republicans gained eight seats in the OhioHouse, narrowing the Democrats’ advantage to 53-46. After the 1994 Senate elections, Republicans lost one seat to the Democrats, but maintained a 20-13 advantage.

The 1991 redistricting plan was challenged in court as violating the Equal Protection clause on the grounds that the plan unfairly packed minorities into districts. The case eventually went to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that while federal courts cannot mandate the creation of minority-packed districts in the absence of a Voting Rights Act violation, states can still create such districts. The 1991 plan was eventually upheld.

In 1999, the League of Women Voters initiated a petition drive to gather signatures for an amendment which would have limited the ability of the political parties to gerrymander districts. The signature-gathering drive was ultimately unsuccessful.

## 2000's

In 1998, Ohio voters elected Jim

Petro (R) as State Auditor, Kenneth Blackwell (R) as Secretary of State, and Robert Taft III (R) as Governor, putting Republicans firmly in control of the Apportionment Board and thus in charge of drawing the state's districts for the 2000's. In 2000, the last election held using the 1991 redistricting plan, Republicans won a 59-40 advantage over Democrats in the Ohio House, while winning a 2112 advantage over Democrats in the Senate. In 2002, in the first elections held under the 2001-2 redistricting plan, Republicans gained three seats in the House, increasing their advantage in that body to 62-37. In the 2004 Senate elections, Republicans held one more seat than in 2000, for a 22 11 advantage.

Sources:
1851 Constitution - http: //www.ohiohistory.org/onlinedoc/ ohgovernment/constitution/ cnst1851.html
Historical Ohio GA partisan composition (Gongwer) - http: //www.gongwer-oh.com/public/ gahis.html
Redistricting documents not subject to Public Records Act - http: //www.lsc.state.oh.us/membersonly/ 125publicrecordslaw.pdf

Appendix A: All Congressional Races Compared to Presidential Results

| District | Rating | Congr Winner | Congressional Margin | Compared to Presidential Margin | Pres Margin | Kerry | Bush |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Competitive | Chabot-R | 20\% | 0.19 | 1\% | 49\% | 50\% |
| 2 | Safe Republican | Portman-R | 43\% | 0.16 | 28\% | 36\% | 64\% |
| 3 | Lean Republican | Turner-R | 25\% | 0.15 | 9\% | 45\% | 54\% |
| 4 | Safe Republican | Oxley-R | 17\% | (0.14) | 31\% | 34\% | 65\% |
| 5 | Safe Republican | Gillmor-R | 34\% | 0.12 | 22\% | 39\% | 61\% |
| 6 | Competitive | Strickland-D | 100\% | 0.99 | 1\% | 49\% | 50\% |
| 7 | Safe Republican | Hobson-R | 30\% | 0.15 | 15\% | 42\% | 57\% |
| 8 | Safe Republican | Boehner-R | 38\% | 0.09 | 29\% | 35\% | 64\% |
| 9 | Safe Democrat | Kaptur-D | 36\% | 0.20 | 17\% | 58\% | 42\% |
| 10 | Safe Democrat | Kucinich-D | 26\% | 0.10 | 17\% | 58\% | 41\% |
| 11 | Safe Democrat | Tubbs Jones-D | 100\% | 0.37 | 63\% | 81\% | 18\% |
| 12 | Competitive | Tiberi-R | 24\% | 0.21 | 3\% | 48\% | 51\% |
| 13 | Safe Democrat | Brown-D | 35\% | 0.24 | 11\% | 55\% | 44\% |
| 14 | Lean Republican | LaTourette-R | 25\% | 0.20 | 5\% | 47\% | 53\% |
| 15 | Competitive | Pryce-R | 20\% | 0.19 | 1\% | 49\% | 50\% |
| 16 | Lean Republican | Regula-R | 33\% | 0.25 | 8\% | 46\% | 54\% |
| 17 | Safe Democrat | Ryan-D | 54\% | 0.29 | 26\% | 63\% | 37\% |
| 18 | Safe Republican | Ney-R | 32\% | 0.18 | 15\% | 42\% | 57\% |

Appendix B: All Senate Races Compared to Presidential Results

| Senate District | Rating | winning senator | sen \% | ahead of pres spread | pres Percent | Kerry | Bush |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Safe Republican | Wachtmann - R | 36\% | 0.01 | 35\% | 32\% | 67\% |
| 2 | Competitive | Gardner - R | 25\% | 0.21 | 5\% | 48\% | 52\% |
| 3 | Competitive | Goodman - R | 16\% | 0.13 | 2\% | 49\% | 51\% |
| 4 | Safe Republican | Cates- R | 31\% | (0.01) | 32\% | 34\% | 66\% |
| 5 | Safe Democrat | Roberts - D | 5\% | (0.09) | 14\% | 57\% | 43\% |
| 6 | Safe Republican | Jacobson-R | 29\% | 0.07 | 22\% | 39\% | 61\% |
| 7 | Safe Republican | Schuler - R | 43\% | 0.09 | 34\% | 33\% | 67\% |
| 8 | Safe Republican | Clancy- R | 27\% | 0.01 | 27\% | 36\% | 63\% |
| 9 | Safe Democrat | Mallory - D | 100\% | 0.64 | 36\% | 68\% | 32\% |
| 10 | Safe Republican | Austria - R | 29\% | 0.14 | 15\% | 42\% | 57\% |
| 11 | Safe Democrat | Fedor - D | 45\% | 0.10 | 34\% | 67\% | 33\% |
| 12 | Safe Republican | Jordan - R | 59\% | 0.22 | 37\% | 31\% | 68\% |
| 13 | Lean Democrat | Armbruster - R | 0\% | (0.07) | 7\% | 53\% | 46\% |
| 14 | Safe Republican | Niehaus- R | 34\% | 0.06 | 28\% | 36\% | 64\% |
| 15 | Safe Democrat | Miller - D | 46\% | (0.02) | 48\% | 73\% | 26\% |
| 16 | Lean Republican | Stivers- R | 24\% | 0.17 | 7\% | 46\% | 53\% |
| 17 | Safe Republican | Carey Jr - R | 8\% | (0.14) | 21\% | 39\% | 60\% |
| 18 | Lean Republican | Grendell - R | 19\% | 0.12 | 7\% | 46\% | 54\% |
| 19 | Safe Republican | Harris - R | 35\% | 0.08 | 27\% | 36\% | 63\% |
| 20 | Lean Republican | Padgett- R | 7\% | 0.01 | 6\% | 47\% | 53\% |
| 21 | Safe Democrat | Prentiss - D | 65\% | (0.03) | 67\% | 83\% | 16\% |
| 22 | Safe Republican | Amstutz - R | 100\% | 0.79 | 21\% | 39\% | 60\% |
| 23 | Safe Democrat | Brady - D | 34\% | 0.07 | 27\% | 63\% | 36\% |
| 24 | Competitive | Spada - R | 24\% | 0.21 | 3\% | 48\% | 51\% |
| 25 | Safe Democrat | Fingerhut - D | 69\% | 0.08 | 61\% | 80\% | 19\% |
| 26 | Safe Republican | Mumper - R | 100\% | 0.76 | 24\% | 38\% | 62\% |
| 27 | Lean Democrat | Coughlin - R | 6\% | 0.11 | 5\% | 52\% | 47\% |
| 28 | Safe Democrat | Zurz - D | 31\% | 0.11 | 19\% | 59\% | 40\% |
| 29 | Competitive | Schuring - R | 16\% | 0.14 | 2\% | 51\% | 49\% |
| 30 | Competitive | Wilson - D | 34\% | 0.31 | 3\% | 48\% | 51\% |
| 31 | Safe Republican | Hottinger - R | 100\% | 0.78 | 22\% | 39\% | 61\% |
| 32 | Safe Democrat | Dann - D | 32\% | 0.14 | 19\% | 59\% | 40\% |
| 33 | Safe Democrat | Hagan - D | 36\% | 0.17 | 19\% | 59\% | 40\% |

Appendix C: All House Races Compared to Presidential Results

| House District | Rating | Winner | House \% | Compared to Pres. | Presidential Margin | Kerry | Bush |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Competitive | Blasdel - R | 1\% | (0.04) | 5\% | 47\% | 52\% |
| 2 | Safe Republican | Peterson-R | 38\% | 0.05 | 32\% | 34\% | 66\% |
| 3 | Safe Republican | Carmichael - R | 31\% | 0.08 | 23\% | 38\% | 61\% |
| 4 | Safe Republican | Williamowski - R | 100\% | 0.67 | 33\% | 33\% | 66\% |
| 5 | Safe Republican | Shaffer - R | 100\% | 0.74 | 26\% | 37\% | 63\% |
| 6 | Lean Republican | Latta - R | 25\% | 0.18 | 7\% | 46\% | 53\% |
| 7 | Safe Democrat | Yuko - D | 47\% | 0.01 | 47\% | 73\% | 26\% |
| 8 | Safe Democrat | Mason - D | 100\% | 0.37 | 63\% | 81\% | 18\% |
| 9 | Safe Democrat | Woodard - D | 100\% | 0.32 | 68\% | 84\% | 16\% |
| 10 | Safe Democrat | Smith - D | 100\% | 0.34 | 66\% | 83\% | 17\% |
| 11 | Safe Democrat | Key - D | 100\% | 0.35 | 65\% | 83\% | 17\% |
| 12 | Safe Democrat | Debose - D | 72\% | 0.00 | 71\% | 85\% | 14\% |
| 13 | Safe Democrat | Skindell - D | 100\% | 0.59 | 41\% | 70\% | 29\% |
| 14 | Safe Democrat | Miller - D | 76\% | 0.47 | 29\% | 64\% | 35\% |
| 15 | Safe Democrat | DeGeeter - D | 67\% | 0.53 | 15\% | 57\% | 42\% |
| 16 | Lean Republican | Kilbane - R | 20\% | 0.15 | 6\% | 47\% | 53\% |
| 17 | Competitive | Trakas - R | 6\% | 0.05 | 1\% | 50\% | 49\% |
| 18 | Lean Republican | Patton - R | 33\% | 0.28 | 5\% | 47\% | 52\% |
| 19 | Safe Republican | Flowers - R | 26\% | 0.15 | 11\% | 44\% | 55\% |
| 20 | Competitive | McGregor - R | 11\% | 0.09 | 2\% | 51\% | 49\% |
| 21 | Competitive | Reidelbach - R | 5\% | 0.01 | 5\% | 52\% | 47\% |
| 22 | Competitive | Hughes - R | 22\% | 0.21 | 1\% | 49\% | 50\% |
| 23 | Safe Republican | Wolpert - R | 100\% | 0.81 | 19\% | 40\% | 59\% |
| 24 | Competitive | Smith - R | 56\% | 0.54 | 2\% | 51\% | 49\% |
| 25 | Safe Democrat | Stewart - D | 10\% | (0.09) | 18\% | 59\% | 40\% |
| 26 | Safe Democrat | Mitchell - D | 100\% | 0.42 | 58\% | 79\% | 21\% |
| 27 | Safe Democrat | Beatty - D | 100\% | 0.35 | 65\% | 82\% | 17\% |
| 28 | Lean Republican | Raussen - R | 6\% | 0.01 | 5\% | 47\% | 52\% |
| 29 | Safe Republican | Blessing Jr - R | 12\% | (0.08) | 21\% | 39\% | 60\% |
| 30 | Safe Republican | Seitz - R | 46\% | (0.07) | 53\% | 23\% | 76\% |
| 31 | Lean Democrat | Driehaus - D | 39\% | 0.29 | 9\% | 54\% | 45\% |
| 32 | Safe Democrat | Barrett - D | 100\% | 0.49 | 51\% | 75\% | 24\% |
| 33 | Safe Democrat | Yates - D | 48\% | 0.05 | 43\% | 71\% | 29\% |
| 34 | Safe Republican | Brinkman Jr - R | 20\% | 0.02 | 18\% | 41\% | 59\% |
| 35 | Safe Republican | Scheider - R | 45\% | 0.06 | 40\% | 30\% | 70\% |
| 36 | Safe Republican | Setzer - R | 24\% | 0.00 | 24\% | 38\% | 62\% |
| 37 | Safe Republican | Husted - R | 30\% | 0.12 | 18\% | 41\% | 59\% |
| 38 | Safe Republican | White - R | 21\% | (0.01) | 22\% | 39\% | 61\% |
| 39 | Safe Democrat | Allen - D | 64\% | 0.08 | 56\% | 78\% | 22\% |
| 40 | Safe Democrat | Strahorn - D | 40\% | 0.02 | 38\% | 69\% | 31\% |
| 41 | Competitive | Williams - D | 0\% | (0.02) | 2\% | 49\% | 51\% |
| 42 | Competitive | Widowfield - R | 14\% | 0.10 | 4\% | 48\% | 52\% |
| 43 | Competitive | Taylor - R | 15\% | 0.15 | 1\% | 50\% | 49\% |
| 44 | Safe Democrat | Sykes - D | 100\% | 0.42 | 58\% | 79\% | 21\% |
| 45 | Safe Democrat | Otterman - D | 48\% | 0.19 | 29\% | 64\% | 35\% |
| 46 | Safe Republican | Wagoner - R | 24\% | 0.14 | 11\% | 45\% | 55\% |
| 47 | Safe Democrat | Ujvagi - D | 42\% | 0.15 | 28\% | 64\% | 36\% |
| 48 | Safe Democrat | Brown - D | 100\% | 0.42 | 58\% | 79\% | 21\% |
| 49 | Safe Democrat | Perry - D | 42\% | 0.23 | 19\% | 59\% | 40\% |
| 50 | Lean Republican | Hagan - R | 16\% | 0.07 | 9\% | 45\% | 54\% |
| 51 | Lean Republican | Oelslager - R | 100\% | 0.93 | 7\% | 46\% | 53\% |
| 52 | Safe Democrat | Healy II - D | 42\% | 0.15 | 27\% | 63\% | 36\% |
| 53 | Safe Republican | Webster - R | 32\% | 0.03 | 29\% | 35\% | 64\% |


| 54 | Safe Republican | Combs - R | 100\% | 0.71 | 29\% | 36\% | 64\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 55 | Safe Republican | Coley - R | 40\% | 0.02 | 38\% | 31\% | 69\% |
| 56 | Safe Democrat | Koziura - D | 48\% | 0.08 | 39\% | 69\% | 30\% |
| 57 | Competitive | Martin - R | 4\% | 0.03 | 1\% | 49\% | 51\% |
| 58 | Safe Republican | Walcher - R | 8\% | (0.04) | 12\% | 43\% | 56\% |
| 59 | Safe Democrat | Carano Sr - D | 24\% | 0.09 | 15\% | 57\% | 42\% |
| 60 | Safe Democrat | Patton - D | 64\% | 0.07 | 57\% | 78\% | 21\% |
| 61 | Competitive | Boccieri - D | 31\% | 0.28 | 3\% | 48\% | 51\% |
| 62 | Competitive | Fende - D | 7\% | 0.06 | 0\% | 50\% | 50\% |
| 63 | Competitive | Cassell - D | 1\% | (0.04) | 5\% | 47\% | 52\% |
| 64 | Safe Democrat | Law - R | 8\% | (0.14) | 22\% | 61\% | 39\% |
| 65 | Safe Democrat | Harwood - D | 41\% | 0.14 | 28\% | 64\% | 36\% |
| 66 | Safe Republican | Uecker - R | 100\% | 0.58 | 42\% | 29\% | 71\% |
| 67 | Safe Republican | Raga - R | 100\% | 0.56 | 44\% | 28\% | 72\% |
| 68 | Lean Democrat | Chandler - D | 28\% | 0.18 | 9\% | 54\% | 45\% |
| 69 | Safe Republican | Calvert - R | 11\% | (0.03) | 14\% | 43\% | 57\% |
| 70 | Safe Republican | DeWine - R | 39\% | 0.17 | 21\% | 39\% | 60\% |
| 71 | Safe Republican | Evans, David - R | 15\% | (0.06) | 22\% | 39\% | 61\% |
| 72 | Competitive | Kearns - R | 20\% | 0.15 | 4\% | 52\% | 48\% |
| 73 | Safe Republican | Harnett - D | 100\% | 0.83 | 17\% | 41\% | 58\% |
| 74 | Safe Republican | Buehrer - R | 100\% | 0.74 | 26\% | 37\% | 63\% |
| 75 | Safe Republican | Hoops - R | 38\% | (0.02) | 41\% | 29\% | 70\% |
| 76 | Safe Republican | Gilb - R | 36\% | (0.03) | 39\% | 30\% | 70\% |
| 77 | Safe Republican | Faber - R | 40\% | 0.00 | 39\% | 30\% | 69\% |
| 78 | Safe Republican | Seaver - D | 100\% | 0.62 | 38\% | 31\% | 69\% |
| 79 | Safe Republican | Fessler - R | 32\% | (0.01) | 34\% | 33\% | 67\% |
| 80 | Competitive | Redfern - D | 100\% | 0.96 | 4\% | 52\% | 48\% |
| 81 | Safe Republican | Wagner - R | 19\% | 0.05 | 14\% | 43\% | 57\% |
| 82 | Safe Republican | Reinhard - R | 24\% | 0.01 | 23\% | 38\% | 61\% |
| 83 | Safe Republican | Core - R | 45\% | 0.09 | 37\% | 32\% | 68\% |
| 84 | Safe Republican | Widener - R | 32\% | 0.08 | 24\% | 38\% | 62\% |
| 85 | Safe Republican | Schlichter - R | 25\% | 0.07 | 17\% | 41\% | 58\% |
| 86 | Safe Republican | Daniels - R | 22\% | (0.06) | 28\% | 36\% | 64\% |
| 87 | Safe Republican | Evans, Clyde - R | 31\% | 0.12 | 19\% | 40\% | 59\% |
| 88 | Safe Republican | Bubp - R | 25\% | (0.08) | 33\% | 33\% | 66\% |
| 89 | Lean Republican | Book - D | 33\% | 0.27 | 7\% | 46\% | 53\% |
| 90 | Safe Republican | Collier - R | 26\% | (0.03) | 29\% | 35\% | 64\% |
| 91 | Safe Republican | Hood - R | 5\% | (0.11) | 17\% | 41\% | 58\% |
| 92 | Lean Democrat | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Stewart, Jimmy } \\ & -\mathrm{R} \end{aligned}$ | 17\% | 0.12 | 5\% | 52\% | 47\% |
| 93 | Safe Republican | Garrison - D | 3\% | (0.07) | 10\% | 45\% | 55\% |
| 94 | Safe Republican | Aslanides - R | 100\% | 0.86 | 14\% | 43\% | 57\% |
| 95 | Lean Democrat | Domenick - D | 38\% | 0.28 | 10\% | 55\% | 45\% |
| 96 | Safe Republican | Sayre - D | 9\% | (0.04) | 13\% | 43\% | 56\% |
| 97 | Safe Republican | Gibbs - R | 30\% | 0.01 | 29\% | 35\% | 64\% |
| 98 | Safe Republican | Dolan - R | 30\% | 0.14 | 17\% | 41\% | 58\% |
| 99 | Lean Democrat | Distel - D | 35\% | 0.29 | 5\% | 52\% | 47\% |


[^0]:    *Because Senate races are staggered, Senate data includes 2002 and 2004 elections.

